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NATURE OF CASE
This is an action commenced by Dahnken, Inc. under the
provision of 25-5-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, to set aside
a conveyance of property from H. Carlton Davis to Harold
Wilmarth as being void under the statute of frauds.
DISPOSITION IN

COURT

The Second District Court, Davis County, State of Utah
held that the conveyance of property from H. Carlton Davis
to Harold Wilmarth was void and that the conveyance was to
be set aside.

The District Court further held that H.

Carlton Davis was the owner of an agreement dated March 2,
1982 between Harold Wilmarth and H. Carlton Davis and
Clarus, a Utah corporation and Sherman B. Hawkes.

Clarus

and Sherman B. Hawkes agreed to convey certain lots or pay
sums of money which was in part consideration of the sale to
Clarus and of the property which had been subject of the
conveyance from H. Carlton Davis to Harold Wilmarth.
Inasmuch as the conveyance from H. Carlton Davis to Harold
Wilmarth was found to be void, the District Court held that
Harold Wilmarth had no right, title or interest in the
agreement dated March 2, 1982.

The judgment of the District

Court was made and entered on the 19th day of July, 1983.
When reference is made to the record throughout the
brief, the abreviation CR 1Court Record) shall apply to the
first volume of the record on appeal and Tr. (Trial
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Transcript> shall apply to the trial transcript in the
second volume of the record on appeal.
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant-Appellant seeks to have the judgment
reversed, with instructions to the District Court to enter
judgment dismissing plaintiff's action and restore to
Wilmarth the value of his agreement dated March 2, 1982.
Alternatively, defendant seeks to have the judgment
reversed, with the case being remanded to the trial court
for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant Harold Wilmarth, who resides in Warrensburg,
Missouri, is the stepfather to defendant H. Carlton Davis.
(Tr. page 66).

Although H. Carlton Davis was named as a

defendant in the proceedings in the District Court, Mr.
Davis was not served and he made no appearance in the case.
During the nine year period from approximately 1968
through 1977, Mr. Wilmarth loaned numerous small sums of
money to Mr. Davis for his personal use in businesses Davis
was attempting to develop.

Mr. Davis agreed that he would

repay these amounts to his stepfather, with 12 percent
interest per annum.

(Tr. pages 66, 67 and 71-76).

On about March 23, 1981, Mr. Davis entered into a
Uniform Real Estate Contract for the purchase of a residence
in Bountiful, Utah.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit Al.

Mr. Davis

owned an equity interest in the residence of approximately
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$115,000.00.

(Tr. page 13 and 21).

In order to repay the

loans previously made to him by his stepfather, Mr. Davis
assigned an interest in the Uniform Real Estate Contract to
Mr. Wilmarth.

The conveyance of this interest was

accomplished by an assignment of the real estate contract.
The assignment was dated November 2, 1982 and named Mr.
Wilmarth as the assignee and Mr. Davis as the assignor.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit C).
The residence which was the object of the Uniform Real
Estate Contract was later sold to Clarus, a Utah Corporation
on March 2, 1982.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit F and G).

In view

of the assignment of the interest to Mr. Wilmarth, it was
necessary that Mr. Davis satisfy the equity interest
transferred to Mr. Wilmarth from the proceeds of the sale to
Clarus.

Because Mr. Wilmarth lived in Missouri and in view

of the fact that Mr. Davis was a stepson of Mr. Wilmarth,
Mr. Davis was requested to act under a power of attorney for
Mr. Wilmarth to complete the transfer of interest to Mr.
Wilmarth in accordance with the assignment from Mr. Davis to
Mr. wilmarth.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit Mand Tr. page 87).

As

part of the sale to Clarus, the purchaser agreed to pay Mr.
Davis $20,000 cash, which represented his equity interest,
and to assign 7 lots in a proposed subdivision at Bear Lake,
Utah to Mr. Wilmarth, which represented Mr. Wilmarth's
interest.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit H).
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Subsequent to the sale of the residence to Clarus and
the assignment of the 7 lots to Mr. Wilmarth, plaintiff
Dahnken, Inc. obtained a judgment against Mr. Davis in an
amount of $69,878.16.

CCR page 8).

Thereupon, plaintiff

sought to attach or garnish the 7 lots which had been
conveyed to Wilmarth.CCR pages 14 and 15).
In the judgment entered on July 19, 1983, the Second
District Court set aside and declared the assignment between
Mr. Davis and Mr. Wilmarth of November 2, 1981 to be null
and void.

The District Court further held that the

garnishment issued on August 23, 1982 against Clarus was a
valid writ pursuant to the judgment rendered in favor of
Dahnken, Inc. on May 17, 1982 by the Third Judicial Court.
Finally, the District Court declared that Mr. Davis was the
owner of the agreement providing for conveyance of the 7
lots from Clarus.

CCR pages 131-133).

At trial, defendant Wilmarth attempted to introduce
checks personally written by himself to various business
entities

as requested by his stepson, Mr. Davis.

These

checks represented loans made to Mr. Davis by Mr. Wilmarth
over a period of many years prior to the real estate
transaction which was being ruled on and ultimately
invalidated by the Second District Court.

These checks were

made personally by Mr. Wilmarth in accordance with his
intent to loan money to Mr. Davis and on terms which were
within his personal knowledge.
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(Tr. pages 71-76).

Although

the trial court allowed oral testimony of Mr. Wilmarth
concerning the loans which he made to his stepson, Mr.
Davis, the court refused to allow the checks to be
introduced as evidence of a loan obligation between Mr.
Davis and Mr. Wilmarth.

(Tr. page 77).

The trial court

further refused testimony of Mr.Wilmarth explaining why Mr.
Wilmarth had made the checks payable to certain named
businesses and the relationship between these certain named
businesses and Mr. Davis.

(Tr. pages 77 and 78).

Such

information was fully within Mr. Wilmarth's personal
knowledge and should have been received by the trial court,
with full and fair evaluation in determining if the loan
obligation did, in fact, exist between Mr. Wilmarth and Mr.
Davis.
ARGUMENT
There are several specific issues, points and basis of
error upon which defendant-appellant will rely and which
will be fully argued herein.

However, there is one

overriding consideration which permeates the entire
proceedings.

That primary, overriding consideration is

simply that given the statutory law applicable to fraudulent
conveyances and the facts as established, justice was not
served by the judgment rendered below.
This case is controlled by two statutory provisions.
The first, Section 25-1-4 of the U.C.A. states:
"Every conveyance made, and every obligation
incurred, by a person who is, or will be thereby
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rendered, insolvent is fraudulent as to creditors
without regard to his actual intent, if the conveyance
is made or the obligation is incurred without a fair
consideration."
The second, Section 25-1-13 states:
"The provisions of this chapter shall not be
construed to affect or impair the title of a purchaser for a valuable consideration, unless it
appears that such purchaser had previous notice
of the fraudulent intent of his immediate granter,
or of the fraud rendering void the title of such
granter."
The Utah Supreme Court has stated very clearly that a
person taking a conveyance for a fair consideration takes a
good title which cannot be affected or impaired unless the
person had previous notice of the fraudulent intent of his
immediate granter or of the fraud rendering void the title
of such granter.

Justice Callister of the Utah Supreme

Court in the case of Ned J. Bowman Company v. White et al,
13 Utah 2d 173, 369 P.2d 962 (1962), stated:
"A creditor may also have a conveyance set
aside if it was made with actual intent to hinder,
delay or defraud either present or future creditors. On
the other hand, if a mortgage and note are given by
a debtor to secure his bona fide pre-existing debts,
which are not of an unreasonable small proportion
of the mortgage, the conveyance will be upheld."
In the present situation, there was no evidence to the
effect that Wilmarth had any notice of any fraudulent intent
whatsoever on the part of Davis in making the conveyance to
Wilmarth.

In fact, all the evidence is to the exact

contrary, and the trial court specifically stated in his
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ruling from the bench at the completion of the trial
proceedings that "I think Wilmarth came into it sadly
enough, maybe totally genuine."
added).

(Tr. page 135). (Emphasis

Wilmarth took the conveyance for bona-fide

pre-existing debts which were owed to him by his stepfather,
and the conveyance should be upheld by the Court.
The evidence is overwhelming to show that the
stepfather, Mr. Wilmarth, had unselfishly loaned a
substantially large amount of money to his stepson, Mr.
Davis, over a period of many years.

The stepfather, quite

understandably, did not require iron clad, legal
documentation from his stepson.

He had his stepson's

promise to repay when the stepson was able to do so, and he
had retained cancelled checks to show the funds which had
been loaned to the stepson.

Who among us, in a similar

situation, would have required more?
The stepson recognized his obligation to repay his
stepfather, and with respect to several loans made to the
stepson in which the funds were to be used in a business of
which the stepson was not the sole owner but had a partner,
the stepson saw fit to provide signed promissory notes to
his stepfather.

(Defendant's Exhibits 10-13).

Under the

circumstances, such action is certainly appropriate.
Later, when the stepson was having some initial success
in a new venture which he

undertaken, he was able to

obtain a fairly large equity in a residence.
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<Tr. page 13).

The stepson acknowledged to the real estate broker that he
owed his Dad some money and that he wanted to transfer an
interest in the recently obtained residence to protect his
stepfather's interest.

(Tr. pages 14, 26, 28, 29, and 30).

Within three to four months from the time in which the
stepson assigned an interest to his stepfather, the
residence was sold.

The stepfather lived in Missouri, and

he gave a power of attorney to his stepson to complete the
sale of the property here in Utah so that the stepfather
would not be required to make a long, unnecessary trip to
Utah to complete the sale.
page 87).

(Plaintiff's Exhibit Mand Tr.

The stepson was faithful to his power of attorney

and the stepfather was satisfied inasmuch as a result of the
sale of the residence, the stepfather obtained rights to 7
lots in property which was being developed at Bear Lake.
The value of the lots was believed to be equivalent to the
past obligations owed to the stepfather from the stepson.
(Tr. pages 84, 85, 87, 95, 96 and 97).
All seems to be well and in proper order for the
stepfather to this point, but dark clouds were forming which
would profoundly effect the stepfather as a result of
totally unsuspected circumstances of which the stepfather
had no knowledge or any control thereof.

His stepson had

purchased a business from the plaintiff Dahnken, and
unfortunately the new venture undertaken by the stepson,
although initially appearing to be doing well, had had some
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reverses.

Dahnken obtained a Judgment By Default against

the stepson, Mr. Davis, some 2-1/2 months after the sale
of the residence in question and some 6-1/2 months after
the interest in the residence had been assigned to the
stepfather, Mr. Wilmarth.

(CR page 5).

Plaintiff Dahnken levied a garnishment against the
rights that the stepfather had in the 7 lots at Bear Lake
and commenced this action to set aside the assignment of the
interest in the residence in question from the stepson to
the stepfather.(CR pages 27-30 and 1-5).
found,

The trial court

in clear contravention of the facts established at

trial, that the assignment of November 2, 1981 from the
stepson, Davis, to the stepfather, Wilmarth, was issued
without a fair consideration.

The trial court further found

that, at the time the stepson made the assignment to his
stepfather, the stepson was insolvent or became insolvent by
reason of the assignment to his stepfather, and that the
assignment to the stepfather was made with actual intent to
hinder, delay, and defraud creditors.

(CR pages 131-133).

Thus, the stepfather after being pulled into a suit in
Utah at a great distance from his own home in Missouri, was
made to defend his rights from an attack by an entity which
he had absolutely no knowledge of or had ever had contact
with either at the time the loans were made to his stepson
or at the time the stepson saw his way clear to repay the
loans.

The stepfather, who had given the loans to his
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stepson with no intent to defraud anyone and who had taken
the assignment in question as the just repayment of those
loans with no intent to defraud anyone, was told by the long
arm of the law that he had no right to such repayment of the
past loans from his stepson.

It can hardly be doubted why

the stepfather feels that he has been treated unjustly and
unfairly.

In fact, equity and justice cry out loudly for a

reversal of the unfairness which is inherent in the decision
of the trial court.
POINT I
EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT FINDING BY TRIAL COURT THAT
THE ASSIGNMENT OF NOVEMBER 2, 1981 FROM DAVIS TO WILMARTH
WAS ISSUED WITHOUT A FAIR CONSIDERATION.
The conclusion of the trial court that the assignment
of November 2, 1981 from Mr. Davis to his stepfather, Mr.
Wilmarth, was without a fair consideration is completely
contrary to the preponderance of evidence which was
presented at trial.

This error in the trial court's

judgment becomes of paramount importance in view of the
applicable statutory and case law in the field of fraudulent
conveyances.

In interpreting the statutory law, the Supreme

Court of Utah has made it clear in the case of Ned J.
Bowman Co. v. White et al, supra, that,
"Under our statutes, a creditor with a matured
claim may have a conveyance set aside to the extent
necessary to satisfy his claim, where such
conveyance was made without fair consideration and
would render the person making it insolvent •.• A
creditor may also have a conveyance set aside if it
was made with actual intent to hinder, delay or
defraud either present or future creditors.
On the
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hand, if a mortgage [the Court had previously
pointed out that a conveyance includes a mortgage
under 25-1-1 U.C.A.J and note are given by a debtor
to secure his bona fide pre-existing debts, which
are not of an unreasonably small proportion of the
mortgage, the conveyance wi 11 be upheld."
The statement of the Supreme Court is a good synopsis
of the applicable statutes, i.e., U.C.A. 25-1-4, 25-1-8, and
25-1-13.

Section 25-1-4 states that every conveyance made

by a person who is, or will thereby be rendered, insolvent
is fraudulent as to creditors, without regard to his actual
intent, if the conveyance is made without a fair
consideration.

Section 25-1-8 sets forth that every

conveyance which is made with the intent to delay, hinder,
or defraud creditors shall be void as against the person
hindered, delayed, or defrauded.

Then Section 25-1-13 makes

it clear that the previous provisions including Section
25-1-8 shall not be construed to affect or impair the title
of a purchaser for a valuable consideration unless it
appears that such purchaser had previous notice of the
fraudulent intent of his immediate grantor, or of the fraud
rendering void the title of such grantor.
In his ruling from the bench at the completion of the
trial proceedings, the trial court judge stated that he
found there was an intent to hinder, defraud and delay
creditors.

(Tr. page 134).

However, the trial judge

specifically further stated, "I think Wilmarth came into it
sadly enough, maybe totally genuine."
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(Tr. page 135).

Thus, the Court below makes it clear that Wilmarth was not
found to have had previous notice of the fraudulent intent
of his immediate grantor even if, for purposes of argument,
his immediate grantor did indeed have fraudulent intent.
Thus, in view of the lack of any intent to hinder, defraud
and delay on the part of Wilmarth, it is clear that the
finding of the trial court that the assignment of November
2, 1981 from Davis to Wilmarth was issued without a fair
consideration is pivotally important in this case.

The

evidence clearly does not support such a finding, and
without that finding, the conveyance cannot be considered to
be fraudulent.

The conveyance simply should not have been

set aside, and the judgment of the trial court in setting
the conveyance aside should be reversed.
The preponderance of evidence given at the trial leaps
forward with but only one conclusion and that is that the
assignment of November 2, 1981 from Davis to Wilmarth was
given for consideration of past loans and debts due from
Davis to Wilmarth.

It is applicable to point out here that

the Supreme Court in Ned J. Bowman co. v. White, supra,
stated:
"Whether a conveyance is fraudulent as to
creditors must be determined from the facts of
each case and from the circumstances surrounding
the transaction, keeping in mind that the purpose
of
is not to prevent a debtor from
securing his honest debts.
(Emphassis added).
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The thrust of the facts as determined at trial in the
present case and the circumstances surrounding the
transaction in question point in one direction only, and
that is that the conveyance was made to secure the honest
debts of Davis in the form of previous loans made from his
stepfather, Mr. Wilmarth.

As pointed out by the Supreme

Court in the portion of the statement quoted immediately
hereinabove, the purpose of our law is not to prevent a
debtor such as Mr. Davis from securing his honest debts.

It

should be added, that hopefully, the law does not have the
purpose to prevent an honest creditor such as Mr. Wilmarth
from receiving payment on an honest debt.
Turning to the evidence given at trial, the testimony
of plaintiff's own witness, the real estate agent who
handled the transactions concerning the residence in
question, is indeed in point.

<The real estate agent's name

is Sid Davis and he is of no known relation to Mr. H.
Carlton Davis, the stepson in the present case. To avoid
confusion due to the same last names, the real estate agent
is hereinafter referred to as the real estate agent.)

The

real estate agent testified clearly to the fact that Mr.
Davis, the stepson, told him that the assignment of November
2, 1981 was made to Mr. Wilmarth because he (Mr. Davis) owed
his Dad (stepfather, Mr. Wilmarth) some money.

On direct

examination, the real estate agent testified that he was
requested by the stepson, Mr. Davis, to make out the
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assignment to Mr. Wilmarth.

When the real estate agent was

asked if he knew Mr. Davis' reason for making the
assignment, the real estate agent replied,
"He mentioned a couple of times, he owed his Dad
some money and felt it would be a little more
comfortable if his Dad was secured on it."
(Tr.
page 14 >.
on cross examination, the real estate agent was asked, "And

r believe you indicated that he stated a purpose of that as
being to protect a debt owed to his stepfather; is that
correct?"

The real estate agent answered,

•well at the time I said, what do you want to
transfer it for? And he said, well, I owe my Dad
some money and I just feel better if he had some
security on it."
(Tr. page 26).
The stepfather, Mr. Wilmarth, further testified to the
loans made to his stepson, Mr. Davis.

Mr. Wilmarth

testified as to six or seven separate loans which were made
over a period of years from 1968 to 1977 and which amounted
to about $97,581.80 including interest on the loans to the
date of trial.

(Tr. pges 71-76).

Mr. Wilmarth testified as

to a series of checks that he had personally made out, and
that he had retained in his files.
of the checks.

He had present custody

These checks showed the dollar amounts of

the individual loans which were made to his stepson, Mr.
Davis.

All of these checks except one were refused to be

received in evidence by the trial court because they were

-14-

made out to three different entities instead of the stepson,
Mr. Davis, personally.

(Tr. page 77).

One check,

defendant's exhibit 6, was admitted into evidence.

That

check was made out on March 30, 1977 to Herb Davis, the
stepson, for an amount of $9,100.00.

Mr. Wilmarth testified

that all the checks, including the one for $9,100.00
identified as defendant's exhibit 6 were for loans.

The

terms of the loans were testified to by Mr. Wilmarth as no
specific time to pay them back, but that 12% interest was to
be paid on each loan.

(Tr. page 71-76>.

The refusal of the trial court to receive the other
checks is believed to be fatal error and will be discussed
in detail hereinafter.

Mr. Wilmarth testified that all his

business dealings with his stepson were done by telephone or
through the mail.

(Tr. page 67>.

Under those

circumstances, it is quite logical that Mr. Wilmarth would
make the checks out in the name of the companies which Mr.
Davis had organized and owned.

This would identify the

purpose for which the money was being loaned.

Four of the

checks which were refused to be received in evidence were
made out to Econo-Optic, and one of those checks
(Defendant's Exhibit 5) was endorsed by H. C. Davis, the
stepson, with the other three being endorsed by Econo-Optic.
Four promissory notes from Econo-Optic to Mr. Wilmarth were
introduced into evidence.

These promissory notes are

identified as defendant's exhibits 10, 11, 12, and 13.
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Exhibit 13 is a note for the face amount of $5,150.00 to be
paid on or before March 23, 1975.
December 23, 1974.

The date of this note is

The note is signed by H. C. Davis,

President and F. A. Erlinger, Secretary.
note for the face amount of $6,800.00.

Exhibit 10 is a
The date of this

note is March 1, 1975, and the note is to be paid by March
1, 1978.

The note is signed by H. C. Davis, President.

Exhibit 11 is a note for the face amount of $6,800.00.

The

date of this note is May 1, 1975, and the note is to be paid
by May 1, 1978.

The note is signed by H. C. Davis,

President.

Exhibit 12 is a note for the face amount of

$6,800.00.

The date of this note is June 1, 1975, and the

note is to be paid by June 1, 1978.

The note is signed by

H. C. Davis, President.
Mr. Wilmarth testified that loans were made to Mr.
Davis and that the funds were to be used in the businesses
in which Mr. Davis was at that time engaged.
71-76).

(Tr. pages

Under the circumstances, it is consistent that each

of the checks showing the money being loaned and each of the
notes given in return would show the name of the respective
company which Mr. Davis owned and was operating at the time
of the loan.

To Mr. Wilmarth, it is completely consistent

that the companies were simply the alter ego of Mr. Davis,
and as such, making checks to the companies and taking notes
from the companies was the same as making checks to and
taking notes from Mr. Davis personally.
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There was no evidence given at the trial that the money
advanced by Mr. Wilmarth to his stepson was anything but a
loan.

The testimony of the real estate agent who prepared

the assignment from Mr.Davis to Mr. Wilmarth shows a clear
acknowledgment of the loans or debts by Mr. Davis.

When the

real estate agent inquired of Mr. Davis as to why the
assignment to Mr. Wilmarth was being made, Mr. Davis
responded that he owed his Dad <Mr. Wilmarth, his
stepfather) some money and that he wanted his Dad to be
secure on it.

This is clearly an admission or a statement

against Mr. Davis' interest.

It is a clear acknowledgment

of the debt owed to his stepfather.
It is abundantly evident that there was a fair
consideration given for the assignment from Mr. Davis to Mr.
Wilmarth.

Mr. Wilmarth clearly obtained the assignment for

the past debt owed to him, and the assignment should not
have been set aside unless the plaintiff had proved that Mr.
Wilmarth participated in the fraudulent purpose of the
transfer if there were in fact any such fraudulent purpose.
There was absolutely no evidence adduced at trial that Mr.
Wilmarth even remotely sensed that there was any fraudulent
purpose for the assignment made to him by his stepson, Mr.
Davis.

When asked if he had any knowledge of any suits

being filed against Mr. Davis at the time the assignment was
made, Mr. Wilmarth's answer was in the negative both on
direct and cross examination.

(Tr. pages 86 and 101).

-17-

When

asked if he were aware of Mr. Davis being in any financial
difficulties at the time the assignment was made, Mr.
Wilmarth's answer was again a clear negative.
85!.

(Tr. page

When asked if he knew of Mr. Davis having any

financial difficulties in March of 1982 when the residence
was sold and Mr. Wilmarth obtained the rights to the 7 lots
at Bear Lake, his answer again was in the negative.
page 86).

(Tr.

There was no evidence to the contrary, and as

pointed out before, the trial court in his ruling from the
bench at the completion of the trial proceedings
specifically acknowledged and stated that Mr. Wilmarth came
into the proceedings "totally genuine".

(Tr. page 135).

The evidence shows conclusively that there indeed was
fair consideration for the assignment from Mr. Davis to Mr.
Wilmarth, and the trial court found Mr. Wilmarth to be
"totally genuine" in the transaction.

Accordingly, the

transaction should not have been set aside and the judgment
of the trial court in setting the assignment aside and
declaring it void should be reversed.
POINT II
TRIAL COURT MADE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN REFUSING TO ADMIT
PERSONAL CHECKS WRITTEN BY WILMARTH AS EVIDENCE OF LAWFUL
LOAN OBLIGATIONS FROM DAVIS TO WILMARTH.
A paramount issue in this case involved the question of
whether fair consideration was given for the assignment from
Mr. Davis to Mr. Wilmarth.

As mentioned previously, Mr.

Wilmarth attempted to introduce six checks into evidence
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which he testified represented loans made by himself to his
stepson, Mr. Davis.

These check were identified as

defendant's exhibits 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, and 8.

Four of the

checks, identified as defendant's exhibits 2, 3, 4, and 5
were all made out to Econo-Optic.

One check, identified as

defendant's exhibit 7 was made out to Mothers Food for
Health.

The other remaining check, identified as

defendant's exhibit 8 was made out to Nutri-Vite.

The trial

court refused to receive the checks into evidence by
sustaining plaintiff's objection that the checks were not
material and relevant inasmuch as they are made out to other
corporations and do not reflect any obligations on the part
of Mr. Davis personally.

(Tr. page 77!.

Inasmuch as these checks related directly to the
paramount issue in this case, i.e., the question of whether
fair consideration was given for the assignment from Mr.
Davis to Mr. Wilmarth, the trial court clearly committed
reversible error in refusing to receive the checks into
evidence. The checks were clearly relevant evidence and they
should have been received into evidence.
In McCormick on Evidence, Second Edition, Hornbook
Series, page 437 it is said that
"The most acceptable test of relevancy is the
question does the evidence offered render the
desired lnerence more probable than it would be
without the evidence?"
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It can hardly be doubted that the checks offered in evidence
in the present case rendered the desired inference more
probable than it would have been, or was, without the
evidence.

The checks were direct evidence of an outlay of

money to the stepson, and with testimony of the surrounding
facts which were well within the personal knowledge of the
maker of the checks, Mr. Wilmarth, the checks were a
critically important link in the chain of proof.
Although the checks did not in and of themselves and on
their face prove the ultimate issue of a loan, they do,
along with other testimony well within the knowledge of Mr.
Wilmarth, conclusively establish an outlay of a considerable
amount of money by Mr. Wilmarth for the use of his stepson,
Mr. Davis.
That an offer of proof need not cover every fact
necessary to prove the issue is well established in the law.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated, in Mccandles v. United
States, 298 U.S. 342 <1936l:
"an offer of proof cannot be denied as remote or
speculative because it does not cover every fact
necessary to prove the issue.
If it be an
appropriate link in the chain of proof, that is
enough."
Judge Learned Hand, in United States v. Pugliese, 153 F.2d
497 !2d Cir. 1946), stated:
"Its relevancy did not, and indeed could not,
demand that it be conclusive; most convictions
result
the cumulation of bits of proof which,
taken singly, would not be enough in the mind of a
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fair minded person. All that is necessary and all
that is possible, is that each bit may
enough
rational connection with the issue to be considered
a factor contributing to an answer. Wigmore
Section 12."
Clearly, the checks in the present case at least when taken
with the personal knowledge of their maker, Mr. Wilmarth,
had enough rational connection with the issue of whether
loans had been made to the stepson, Mr. Davis, to be
considered and admitted as evidence. The trial court in
refusing to admit such evidence clearly committed reversible
error.

As pointed out previously, the facts are clearly

enough defined that this Court should reverse the judgment
of the trial court and enter judgment for the
defendant-appellee.

The judgment should be reversed and a

judgment of no cause of action should be entered.

At the

least, this Court should reverse the judgment of the trial
court and remand the case for a new trial in which the
checks can be introduced into evidence.
POINT III
EVIDENCE DOES NOT SUPPORT FINDING BY TRIAL COURT THAT
THE ASSIGNMENT OF NOVEMBER 2, 1981 FRCJit DAVIS TO WILMARTH
WAS MADE WITH ACTUAL INTENT TO HINDER, DELAY, AND DEFRAUD
CREDITORS.
The preponderance of the evidence clearly shows that
neither Mr. Davis nor Mr. Wilmarth had any intent whatsoever
to

delay, and defraud creditors in making the

assignment of November 2, 1981.

With respect to Mr.

Wilmarth, the trial court even concluded in its ruling from
the bench at the end of the trial proceedings that Mr.
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Wilmarth came into the proceedings "totally genuine".
page 135).

<Tr.

There was not even a scintilla of evidence

produced at the trial to indicate any intent on the part of
Mr. Wilmarth to hinder, delay, and defraud creditors.
Likewise, there was no evidence produced at trial to
indicate an actual intent on the part of Mr. Davis to
hinder, delay, and defraud creditors.

The testimony of Mr.

Wilmarth is clear that he had advanced several loans to his
stepson, Mr. Davis, over a period from 1968 to 1977.
pages 66 and 71-75).

(Tr.

Mr. Wilmarth testified that in the

summer or fall of 1981, he visited Mr. Davis in Utah.

Mr.

Davis appeared to be doing "really well", and Mr. Wilmarth
asked Mr. Davis to return the money that had been loaned to
Mr. Davis previously.

Mr. Davis responded that he would

take care of the repayment in the not too distant future.
(Tr. page 85 > •
Plaintiff's own witness, the real estate agent who
prepared the assignment of November 2, 1981 from Mr. Davis
to Mr. Wilmarth, specifically testified that Mr. Davis told
him that Mr. Davis owed his stepfather some money, and that
he wanted an interst in the residence property assigned to
Mr. Wilmarth to make Mr. Wilmarth secure on it.
14, 26-27, and 29-30).

(Tr. pages

Thus, Mr. Davis specifically

acknowledged the debt owed to his stepfather and his desire
to transfer an interest in the residence to protect his
stepfather and put him in a more secured position.
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Such action certainly does not show or indicate any
intent to hinder, delay and defraud creditors.

Mr. Justice

Callister, in Ned J. Bowman Co. v. White et al, supra,
said:
"Whether a conveyance is fraudulent as to
creditors must be determined from the facts of
each case and from the circumstances surrounding
the transaction, keeping in mind that the purpose
of our statutes is not to prevent a debtor from
securing his just debts.
(Emphasis added).
certainly there is and should be no proscription against Mr.
Davis acknowledging his just debts and securing these debts.
The finding that the assignment of November 2, 1981 from
Davis to Wilmarth was made with actual intent to hinder,
delay, and defraud creditors is clearly and completely
erroneous.

The judgment should, accordingly, be reversed.
CONCLUSION

There is no legitimate question but that the assignment
of the real property interest of the stepson, Mr. Davis, to
his stepfather, Mr. Wilmarth, in satisfaction of the
pre-existing debt the stepson owed to his stepfather
constituted fair consideration under U.C.A. 25-1-3.
Further, it is beyond question that there was no attempt to
accomplish a fraudulent conveyance by either the stepson,
Mr. Davis, or the stepfather, Mr. Wilmarth.

It is unfair

and inequitable to deny the stepfather, Mr. Wilmarth,
property which he properly received as a result of the
assignment from his stepson, Mr. Davis.
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Mr. Wilmarth

clearly and unequivocably gave fair consideration for the
assignment.

The statutory provisions concerning fraudulent

conveyances are clear as are the case law supporting the
statutory provisions.

The statutes and the case law require

a ruling consistent therewith.

Defendant-appellant

respectfully submits that such ruling can be effected only
with the appropriate dismissal of Plaintiff-Appellee's
Canplaint and Cause of Action, with prejudice.

Consistent

with such a ruling this Court should restore to Mr.
Wilmarth, the defendant-appellant, the value of his
agreement, i.e., the value of the 7 lots which were assigned
to him by the agreement dated March 2, 1982.
Dated this 15th day of December, 1983.
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant

Terry M.Crellin
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